®®®® SIIA Público

Título del libro: New Perspectives On Transparency And Self-Knowledge
Título del capítulo: Transparency Theories versus Other Accounts of Self-Knowledge: Do They Compete or Complement Each Other?

Autores UNAM:
MARTIN FRANCISCO FRICKE;
Autores externos:

Idioma:

Año de publicación:
2024
Resumen:

This chapter looks at the relation between Alex Byrne?s transparency theory and other accounts of self-knowledge. It argues that Byrne?s theory competes most clearly with other epistemic theories of self-knowledge such as Rylean skepticism or inner sense theories. Rationalist accounts of self-knowledge such as those proposed by Sydney Shoemaker are more easily compatible with transparency theories. Shoemaker?s argument for the necessity of self-knowledge in the process of rationally adjusting our beliefs and desires leaves open the question of how this self-knowledge can be acquired. A transparency account complements Shoemaker?s argument by giving an answer to just this question. Shoemaker?s further argument about how a subject with normal cognitive and conceptual capacities could reason from first-order to second-order beliefs has certain structural similarities with Byrne?s theory. It could be seen as giving a more detailed explanation of why the transparency method is justified. Finally, as regards constitutivist accounts such as Crispin Wright?s and Tom Stoneham?s, this chapter argues that they are in need of being complemented by some theory that explains how it is that second-order beliefs are generally coherently integrated with the rest of a person?s mind. Again, a transparency theory such as Byrne?s provides just such an explanation. © 2025 selection and editorial matter, Adam Andreotta and Benjamin Winokur; individual chapters, the contributors.


Entidades citadas de la UNAM: